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Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

Sunil Adam’s Abominable Foreign Policy Advice: “A collapsed Pakistani state is better than a toxic state precariously perched.”

Posted by K.E. White on April 22, 2009

Yes, you read that right. Yesterday’s Huffington Post features Sunil Adam’s review of Obama’s first hundred days. And while it touches on many topics, it’s real aim is U.S.-Pakistan relations–and pushing for a ‘hands off approach’.

It is not too late for him [President Obama] to change course — hands off Pakistan, follow a containment policy in Afghanistan and secure the homeland. Tacitly, this amounts to not propping up the Pakistani establishment through any form of aid — arms or developmental — and letting it sink or sail by its own volition. A collapsed Pakistani state is better than a toxic state precariously perched. Only the likelihood of collapse will galvanize the democratic and modernizing forces within Pakistani society and culminate in a popular revolution.

On the flip side, by taking itself out as a political, economic and military factor in the existence of Pakistan, America will probably help Pakistanis to have an objective national debate about the identity, direction and destiny of their country. Thanks to American influence on the one hand and the avowed threat of India on the other, Pakistan never really had a chance to introspect.

Meanwhile, the most effective policy President Obama could pursue would be to insulate the U.S. and its democratic allies from the likely fallouts of a collapsed Pakistan, including the possibility of Islamists laying their hands on nuclear weapons. In other words, his approach has to be the exact reverse of President Bush’s — making the homeland secure so that “they” can’t follow us home. 

Is such an inward turn really worth the risk? The first question to answer is just how critical is American support to maintaining the current Pakistani regime? Critical, but not vital. First, Pakistan’s “leaders have so far demonstrated a surprising ability to muddle through periodic crises.”* So, on a point that may lend credence to Adam, the world need not fear the imminent threat of nuclear detonation if American support dries up. 

But will this move force Pakistan to change?

Pakistan can find support from other nations, specifically China. (Read this CFR report reviewing their bilateral relationship, and this TIME article highlighting its recent tensions.) In return America loses an imperfect partner, and turns their interest inward–not towards fighting shared enemies, but getting through the day. Expect flare-ups along the Af-Pak  border and Kashmir as Pakistani military seeks 1) retaliation and 2) attempts to turn fundamentalist impulses away from Islamabad.

But there’s a deeper flaw in Adam’s portrayal of Pakistan as merely a client state that sucks resources and changes little. The main determinants of Pakistan’s policies are Pakistan, not outside players. Pakistani leaders–whatever their policy differences–desire nation-state integrity and pursue that policies that foster stability. Adam’s suggestion that Pakistan has only America for support greatly simplifies the Pakistan’s role in the world, and the challenges it faces.

And the idea that the Pakistani public or regime is not lacking ‘self-reflection’ is bewildering. A nation that threw out Musharraf by public protest and returned to liberal rule does not suggest a lack of ‘self-reflection’.

Yes the current government has challenges: the liberal parties are battling amongst themselves, and cannot wrestle power away from the military establishment. But this is not a two-step game of ‘failure’ and ‘success’. Rather its a series of steps–that in many combinations–bring one closer or further away from stability. Abandoning Pakistan does not guarantee reform: it guarantees antagonism and Pakistan aligning its security interests away from America’s security interests.

Imagine the Pakistani viewpoint. Pakistan throws out Musharraf, ushers in liberal rule and (however imperfectly) works with the United States in its Af-Pak mission and in return gets slapped. Something tells me that those predator drone operations will stop, and the Pakistani public will not stomach the site of American forces near their border.

The best strategy for America is to show itself a reliable partner that both puts down a long investment in Pakistan’s future (not just buy-off Pakistan for short-term interests in eradicating terrorists that threaten American interests) that then expects a return on its investment.

And in regards to dealing with Afghanistan, whether it’s Adam’s containment (ie apparently let the current regime crumble and have that country return to it’s fractured past) or active engagement, Pakistan is a critical part of success. Without cooperation from Pakistan, America has no way of either ‘fixing’ Afghanistan through our mini-surge or containing the fail-out of a failed state. 

What is guaranteed by Adam’s policy perscription is ever-expanding lawless areas, which not only destabilize neighboring countries, but pose a threat to America’s homeland and allies.

The key to Afghanistan is following through on an American commitment to bring security and development to that nation. And the key to Pakistan is not (a false) task of forcing it to choose ‘success’ or ‘failure’, but linking Pakistani and American priorities.

A collapsed Pakistani state might never recover, unleashing unpredictable fall-out; a ‘toxic state precariously perched’ can be engaged and strengthened over time–primarily from within.  But, let’s make one thing clear, Pakistan is not a toxic state: it is a challenged nation in need of reliable, long-term partners.

Update (7:10 pm): Secretary of State Hillary Clinton states Pakistan faces a “existential threat”; Dawn reports on the Taliban’s recent moves in Buner–the district neighboring the Swat Valley.


*Krepon, Michael. ‘Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb’

Posted in Afghanistan, Pakistan | Tagged: , , , | 1 Comment »

Trouble in Afghanistan: Wither NATO?

Posted by K.E. White on February 10, 2008

The Canadian-led NATO mission in Afghanistan has run into some considerable trouble.

Canada called for more troops from NATO partners, even threatening to pull out if their request went unanswered.

While Germany has softened its opposition to granting more troops, the United States has increased diplomatic pressure on NATO allies to solve the Afghan dilemma.

Speaking at an international security conference in Munich, Defense Secretary Robert Gates openly pressed NATO members to send more troops to Afghanistan.

From the New York Times:

After weeks of calling on NATO governments to send more combat troops and trainers to Afghanistan, Mr. Gates made his case directly to people across the continent in a keynote address to an international security conference here. Mr. Gates summoned the memory of Sept. 11, 2001, to say that Europe is at risk of becoming victim to attacks of the same enormity.

“I am concerned that many people on this continent may not comprehend the magnitude of the direct threat to European security,” Mr. Gates said. “For the United States, Sept. 11 was a galvanizing event one that opened the American public’s eyes to dangers from distant lands.”

In a hall filled with government officials, lawmakers and policy analysts from around the world, Mr. Gates added: “So now I would like to add my voice to those of many allied leaders on the continent and speak directly to the people of Europe. The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real and it is not going to go away.”

While Iraq dominates headlines in America, Afghanistan remains a vital front in the war on terror. The Afghan-Pakistan border still stands as a critical hotbed of extremist activity.

But getting more troops from war-weary allies is no easy task. France has elevated political success over military success in Afghanistan; Australia refuses to send more troops; and Merkel faces stern opposition to any German troop increase.

From AFP:

According to an opinion poll due to be published in Monday’s edition of the magazine Focus, 84 percent of Germans oppose sending combat troops to the south.

And 63 percent believe the current deployment in northern Afghanistan does not serve German interests, according to the TNS Emnid poll.

Germany, whose troop level deployment in Afghanistan currently stands at about 3,200, earlier this week announced it would take over responsibility from Norway in July for a quick reaction force in the north of the country.

The Sunday Herald—a Scottish newspaper—illustrates just how high the stakes are for NATO in Afghanistan:

The problem is that Nato is not geared up to that kind of thinking, even though it is beginning to concentrate on training the Afghans to take over responsibility for their own security. The alliance was formed to defend the West against attack from the Soviet Union. During that time it never fired a shot in anger, and now it has been tasked to fight what many believe is the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Afghanistan is still considered by the security community as the make-or-break mission for Nato, and the urgency of the situation cannot be overstated,” argues Kate Clouston, an associate of the Royal United Services Institute, in a paper on the alliance’s operations in Afghanistan for the independent think tank. “Substantial reform by Nato allies is needed now if the alliance is ever going to be ready to hand over control of the currently unsecured provinces to Afghan national forces.”

The British publication Telegraph has a detailed article on John McCain’s foreign policy, in particular his views on Afghanistan:

A future President McCain would be expected to win favour with European governments critical of the Bush administration’s approach to combating Islamic extremism, by closing the Guantanamo Bay detention camp in the first weeks of his presidency and declaring that the US will no longer tolerate torture.

British and American pressure on Germany appeared to bear fruit yesterday when it emerged the German government might send an extra 1,000 troops to Afghanistan. But Mr McCain will continue to work to broaden its restrictive rules of engagement.

The Afghanistan offensive will form a major plank of Mr McCain’s outreach to the world, as he battles to win over conservatives in his party.

Posted in Afghanistan, NATO | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Tensions in NATO’s Afghanistan Mission: Canada Wants More Troops, US Paints Dire Picture, Germany on the Fence

Posted by K.E. White on January 30, 2008

Canada—who heads up NATO operations in Afghanistan—is becoming a bit antsy about its peacekeeping role. Earlier this month, a review of Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan—chaired by John Manley—demanded more NATO troops be sent or Canada should terminate its mission there.

Canada’s departure from the NATO mission could be a major blow to the alliance. From

“I think if NATO can’t come through with that help, then I think, frankly, NATO’s own reputation and future will be in jeopardy,” Harper told reporters after endorsing that recommendation from a panel headed by former Liberal cabinet minister John Manley.

Canada, with roughly 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, has lost 78 soldiers and one diplomat. All three opposition parties are pressuring Harper’s Conservatives to end Canada’s combat mission by no later than February 2009, with the NDP and Bloc Quebecois demanding an immediate withdrawal.



The response from other NATO countries? Not fantastic. From Spiegel Online:


Meanwhile, Germany‘s Green Party warned on Wednesday that the deployment of combat troops to northern Afghanistan could lead to the spread of the German mission to the volatile south of the country. Party defense spokesman Winfried Nachtwei told the Leipziger Volkszeitung that the Quick Reaction Force should not “open the door for the Bundeswehr in the south,” and that the government should “guarantee that the limits of the mandate up to now are maintained.” Nachtwei insisted that the combat troops should only be allowed to support troops in the north and not be sent to fight the insurgency.

The German media on Wednesday looked at the implications of the NATO request, which could see Germany further embroiled in Afghanistan.

How coalition partners react to the deteriorating situation is critical to American security. The Afghan-Pakistan border is a terrorist hotbed: threatening not only Afghanistan’s security, but that of the volatile–and nuclear armed–regime in Pakistan.


President Bush pledged to send additional American troops to Afghanistan during his State of the Union address:

“In Afghanistan, America, our 25 NATO allies and 15 partner nations are helping the Afghan people defend their freedom and rebuild their country. Thanks to the courage of these military and civilian personnel, a nation that was once a safe haven for al-Qaida is now a young democracy where boys and girls are going to school, new roads and hospitals are being built, and people are looking to the future with new hope.

“These successes must continue, so we are adding 3,200 Marines to our forces in Afghanistan, where they will fight the terrorists and train the Afghan army and police. Defeating the Taliban and al-Qaida is critical to our security, and I thank the Congress for supporting America‘s vital mission in Afghanistan.”

A report released today paints a bleak picture in Afghanistan. From

The study by former UN ambassador Thomas Pickering and retired Marine Corps General James Jones is due to be released later on Wednesday.

“The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country,” it says.

Posted in Afghanistan, Canada, Foreign Policy, international relations, Manley, NATO | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

Shinzo Abe Leaves: What Next?

Posted by K.E. White on September 19, 2007

AEI’s The American explores the effect of Shinzo Abe’s abrupt departure from Japanese politics. The first section delves into the Japan’s foreign policy struggle. It seems the leader of Japan’s resurgent opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, Ichiro Ozawa favors shifting Japan away from its close relationship with America. And the weakness of Abe’s successor, Taro Aso, doesn’t augur well for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)–Japan’s ruling party.

But as earlier blogged, one must remember the LDP’s historical hold on the Japanese government.

What does the Japan-US relationship bring? Michael Auslin’s piece plunges into the politics of fueling allies of the multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan:

Back in the 1990s, Ozawa championed a more assertive Japanese foreign policy: one not as subservient to the United States, and yet one that gave Japan a global role commensurate with its economic power. But since the July upper house poll, he has refused to consider an extension of the anti-terrorism law that allowed Japanese maritime forces to provide thousands of gallons of fuel to coalition ships operating near Afghanistan. This was a puzzling move, since the election had focused on domestic issues. Abe, however, had declared his intent to get the renewal passed; otherwise Tokyo would have to withdraw its ships from the Indian Ocean starting on November 1st.

Privately, some U.S. government officials are furious with Ozawa for playing politics with the anti-terrorism law. But they are equally furious with Abe for his helplessness. The Japanese have supplied millions of dollars worth of high-grade fuel, which the U.S. cannot deliver, to Pakistani and British ships. The fear is that Pakistan will withdraw its ships if the Japanese leave, thereby eliminating the one Muslim nation in the Afghan coalition.

This is the result of the globalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Washington’s desire for a reliable, go-to partner may have made strategic and even tactical sense, but it appears that Koizumi and Abe’s willingness to fill that role put them far ahead of their fellow citizens. Neither Koizumi nor Abe made a particularly compelling case for why it was in Japan’s best interests to dramatically expand its international activities, especially when those activities required military forces. Some folks in Washington and Tokyo even allege that Japan joined the war on terrorism solely as a down payment for U.S. support against North Korea’s nuclear programs.

Ozawa is now insisting that Japan only join UN-run operations, and that it put less emphasis on the U.S. alliance. This is a risky ploy, both diplomatically and electorally. Washington is unlikely to significantly alter alliance promises, but a more independent approach on Tokyo’s part may, if maintained long enough, slowly drive the two partners apart, as was the case with America and France during the Cold War. If Japanese voters get a chance to see what such isolation is like, they may well punish Ozawa for doing unnecessary damage to Japan’s most important alliance. In either case, it will have an impact on Washington’s dealings with the rest of Asia, where some believe the U.S. is moving closer to China.

Japan is now at a crossroads. Abe’s likely successor, Foreign Minister Taro Aso, does not have deep political support among the populace, and is suspected by Japan’s neighbors of being a hardliner. Aso—or whoever becomes premier—faces serious challenges. Will economic reform continue? Will Japan’s bold, yet so far largely rhetorical, new diplomacy survive? Is this the beginning of a true two-party system in Japan? Will Washington give its Asian ally the space to sort out these developments? There’s a lot more riding on it than free gasoline.

Posted in Afghanistan, Ichiro Ozawa, Japan, Michael Auslin, Shinzo Abe, Taro Aso | Leave a Comment »

Wednesday News-Round Up: European Union

Posted by K.E. White on May 30, 2007

“During the interaction on the sidelines of Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Mukherjee is understood to have emphasised the need for resolving the Iran nuclear issue through dialogue, avoiding use of force.”

“EUPOL Afghanistan will comprise 160-170 men by the end of 2007. They will be deployed among the NATO-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) across the country, including in the southern Kandahar and Helmand provinces.”

“French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who opposes Turkey’s EU membership, has floated the idea of a “Mediterranean Union” but said recently the proposal was not meant as a consolation prize for Turkey if the Muslim nation should lose its bid to join the EU.

Turkish media have dubbed the proposal “Club Med” after the vacation resorts.”

· EU-Pakistan Talks

“Pakistan has demanded duty-free access to European Union (EU) markets for goods produced in the tribal areas of the country.

‘The EU should provide duty free access to the goods manufactured in the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) being established in the tribal areas by the US,” Pakistan suggested to the EU delegation on May 24, the last day of the two-day Joint Commission meeting in Islamabad.’”

· Spain & Netherlands to Resuscitate EU Constitution?

· EU Cooperate to Combat E-Terrorism and Kidnapping

Posted in Afghanistan, EU Constitution, European Union, Netherlands, Spain, Terrorism | Leave a Comment »

The Hawks Mourn: AEI’s Annual “Pre-Briefing” on President Bush’s Sixth State of the Union

Posted by K.E. White on January 24, 2007

The mood was sullen today at the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) annual State of the Union “pre-briefing.” 

Six foreign policy analysts at AEI spoke on what the President will—or should—discuss latter tonight, all reiterating a similar theme: never has the President been so weak, and never has he had so much to prove. 

Danielle Pletka, making clear that foreign policy would not be lost to domestic issues in Bush’s upcoming, ably moderated the discussion, guiding the five AEI analysts ably and pulling their wonkish talks into a coherent and compelling—if one-sided—narrative. 

Michael Rubin argued, “while some might criticize Bush’s remarks five years ago as being unhelpful in diplomacy, in reality they were prescient,” emphasizing the growing danger Iran and North Korea pose to international stability. 

While side-stepping the issue of what role those remarks had in creating these sources of international crisis, made the case for tough U.S. diplomacy on Iran and North Korea. 

Rubin recommended President Bush “recognize that there are commonalities among the reformers, the pragmatists, the reformers,” continuing by claiming that “[t]he difference between these factions is one of style, not one of substance.” 

But he conceded a more general failure of America’s approach to Iran: “What I am saying is that the United States isn’t good at playing this Iran game. Of trying to be puppeteer, of trying to engage one faction verses the other.” 

Leon Aron, AEI’s Russia expert, bemoaned “the shrinking of the common commitmentsLeon Aron of every one of the four mainstay areas of the U.S.-Russia strategic dialogue: the war on terror, non-proliferation, Russia’s reliability as a global energy supplier, and its move towards democracy.” 

These common interests will “shrink even further…in the next two years,” Aron stated. 

“[T]he State of the Union speech will matter very little,” Gary Schmitt posed, going against the conventional wisdom of the news media and anchoring the theme of the discussion. 

Gary Schmitt“[P]resident’s can make very fine speeches,” Schmitt told the audience, “but after a time it was a coin that got spent too readily. People began to hear great speeches, but if you don’t see the follow through—the actions—people begin to dismiss the speeches. 

He continued by pointing to the dual-pronged source of the public’s dissatisfaction with President Bush: the botched response to Hurricane Katrina at home and a war effort abroad perceived as failing. 

“The reality in Iraq is what determines public perception. The reality in Katrina, the results of the Hurricane there, are what determined perceptions. And those perceptions are that we have a President that may have very fine policy ideas but is very ineffective in carrying them out.” 

Dan Blumenthal, AEI’s Asia analyst, saw any improvement on the North Korean nuclear dilemma ““only happen[ing] if we start to see some success in Iraq.” 

But Blumenthal seemed pessimistic, finding the Bush administration’s bureaucracy favoring compromise with North Korea, similar to the position of China—not tightening the screws to China by letting Japan out of the nuclear box, or making the de-nuclearization of North Korea the “litmus test” for Sino-American relations. 

But he hoped for some action, lest we have President Bush hand to the next administration “a North Korea that is irreversibly nuclear at this point.” 

Thomas Donnelly, AEI’s Iraq speaker, saw the escalation as a workable strategy: but pointed to the many obstacles Bush must overcome for success in Iraq. 

Donnelly argued that the Bush administration must still show there is a unity of commandThomas Donnelly in Iraq—with Petraeus in the top role; clarify the troop numbers and stages of the proposed surge; and, finally, have ready a reconstruction that works in Iraq. 

Donnelly was well aware of the new political landscape, telling the audience that newly empowered Democrats will point “both barrels to the President on Iraq.” 

He also saw General David Petraeus’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee as more important to Congressional support for Iraq than the State of the Union, conceding the extreme weakness of President Bush to rally the nation behind his foreign policy in Iraq. 

The outlook looked gloomy for all the speakers. 

Success in Iraq, while still seen as achievable, was by no means guaranteed—these speakers blamed domestic politics rather than conditions in Iraq.

And the real threat for many in the room, a nuclear Iran and a further nuclearized North Korea, seemed ever more illusive to contain with Iraq’s attention-stealing and resource-draining present condition. 

Though what seemed most clear to all these speakers was the realization that the aggressive neo-conservative foreign policy was a mere step away from extinction. Unless the compromised Bush administration shows success in Iraq soon, not only will the Bush legacy be tarnished but so too neo-conservative approach to America’s foreign policy.

Posted in Afghanistan, American Enterprise Institute, Bush administration, China, Congress, Dan Blumenthal, Danielle Pletka, Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Gary Schmitt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Leon Aron, Michael Rubin, neoconservatism, North Korea, Terrorism, Think Tank, Thomas Donnelly | Leave a Comment »

Book Guide–John Mueller’s “Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them.”

Posted by K.E. White on January 8, 2007

Professor Mueller has penned a eye-opening and troubling account of not only America’s post 9/11 approach to homeland security, but to our nation’s overall approach to international security.

Mueller highlighting the waste of our government’s current anti-terror spending; charts our nation’s history of overreaction in foreign policy; and, pointedly asks, how large is the terrorist threat–and how should we fight it?

Read Proliferation’s Book Guide here.

Posted in Afghanistan, Bush administration, Homeland Security, Iran, Iraq, James Gilmore, John Mueller, WMD | Leave a Comment »

Book Fact Sheet–John Mueller’s “Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them.”

Posted by K.E. White on January 8, 2007

Professor Mueller has penned a eye-opening and troubling account of not only America’s post 9/11 approach to homeland security, but to our nation’s overall approach to international security.

Mueller highlighting the waste of our government’s current anti-terror spending; charts our nation’s history of overreaction in foreign policy; and, pointedly asks, how large is the terrorist threat–and how should we fight it?

Posted in Afghanistan, Bush administration, Homeland Security, Iran, Iraq, James Gilmore, John Mueller, WMD | 1 Comment »

The Fence Is Going Up! ( No, not the Mexican one–the fence between Pakistan and Afghanistan)

Posted by K.E. White on January 4, 2007

Pakistan is going ahead with plans to construct a fence along its Afghan border. The policy was confirmed publicly during a joint press conference with Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, and Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan.

VOA’s Benajmin Sand gives this brief recap of the tension between the two countries:

U.S. and Afghan officials claim pro-Taleban insurgents have established several bases in Pakistan that are used to mount raids in Afghanistan. Pakistan insists it is doing everything it can to help improve regional security.

It didn’t help much when Pakistan made “peace” last September with pro-Taliban forces settled along the Pakastani-Afghan border.

WaPo’s coverage:

Kabul, Afghanistan, Sept. 5 — The government of Pakistan signed a peace accord Tuesday with pro-Taliban forces in the volatile tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, agreeing to withdraw its troops in return for the fighter’s pledge to stop attacks inside Pakistan and across the border.

Under the pact, foreign fighters would leave North Waziristan or live peaceable lives if they remained. The militias would not set up a “parallel” government administration.

Radio Free Europe
and American Thinker’s Rick Moran offer up some good reporting on the deal.
The BBC gives a good strategic view of Pakistan–making it clear why America and Pakistan’s fate are tied, when it comes to the fight against Islamic extermism.

The government says everything is on schedule for the re-election of President Pervez Musharraf and general elections by the end of 2007.

Yet Pakistanis are still gripped with severe bouts of uncertainty and few believe the government’s assurances….Musharraf's headache

After his recent outbursts against extremism and the need for people to vote for moderates, rather than religious extremists, the long-running speculation that the army has struck a deal with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and its leader in self-imposed exile, Benazir Bhutto, are rife.

Both sides deny any deal, despite the political buzz.

However Gen Musharraf has made it clear that the return of Benazir Bhutto is out of the question. So too, he says, is the return of the prime minister he deposed, Nawaz Sharif, the exiled leader of another faction of the PML…

If there is a compromise and a deal with the PPP, it would mean the military breaking of its alliance with the Islamic parties that presently rule the provinces of Balochistan and the North West Frontier.

It is something that many in the US and western Europe are desperate to see happen and would clearly applaud…

After seven years of Gen Musharraf and the military, people are tired of the army and looking for change.

Moreover only a genuine civilian government could begin the attempt to start a reconciliation process with all the alienated, angry elements of society such as the Baloch nationalists and the Pashtun extremists in the tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan.

Is such a transformative election likely?

Not really.

But on a lighter note, Pakistan now allows kite-flying.

drafted by kwhite

Posted in Afghanistan, Diplomacy, Pakistan, Terrorism | Leave a Comment »